Joe Nye, the University Distinguised Service Professor at Harvard's JFK School of Government and international policy scholar renowned for his work around soft power, has an very good column in today's Washington Post.
Nonproliferation After North Korea
Joe brings a wealth of knowledge on non-proliferation and its history to the table on the question of North Korean non-proliferation, since non-proliferation is perhaps Joe's most important specialization.
As Joe argues, we are probably ahead of the game, right now, with non-proliferation, given the number of total countries that have pursued a nuclear defense policy. And there is much reason that we may make additional gains as countries, like South Africa, take up a nuclear defense only to give it up as countries commit to nuclear non-proliferation as a principle rather than as a political or legal constraint (where the only sustainable future for non-proliferation lies, in reality, I believe).
Joe recommends several actions to prevent future non-proliferation on the Korean continent:
1) Security guarantees for Japan and South Korea to prevent North Korea's neighbors who might feel threatened from pursuing their own nuclear defenses.
2) Strengthening international institutions committed to non-proliferation, including U.N. sanctions against North Korean nuclear development and to enforce norms of nonproliferation.
3) Increasing the budget and inspection capabilities of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) and supporting IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei's plan for creating a bank of enriched uranium to made available in exchange for guarantees that countries will not develop their own independent plants (thus IAEA controls the production, sale, and trade of enriched uranium and weapons-grade nuclear material).
4) Continue warning North Korea with dire reprisals if it exports nuclear weapons or materials and stiffening the resolve of China and South Korea for enforcing trade, financial and weapons export/import sanctions, especially around trade contributing to a North Korean nuclear program.
It is refreshing and precient for Joe to acknowledge a reality that I am anticipating, which is that a sanctions regime will likely erode in its effectiveness, within a year Joe believes, which is why I think sanctions are likely a mistake around anything but limiting North Korea's capacity to export weapons or materials to terrorist groups, rogue states, or other actors likely to use such weapons against U.S. and international interests, which is probably still quite a ways off.
From there, Joe gets to a long-range strategy (a long-term strategy being the only one that makes sense to me, at this point, since North Korea's capacity to develop a full-blown nuclear program capable of presenting a credible threat or the capacity to export materials is still a future rather than a present danger):
"A long-term strategy will require a carrot as well as a stick. We can offer recognition and economic integration in return for a freeze in the production of fissile material, IAEA inspections and a renewed commitment to a long-term denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Someday, probably within the next decade, the North Korean regime will disappear (probably more rapidly through integration than isolation) and prospects will improve that Korea could follow the South African example."
Suggestions 1 and 3 and qualified versions of 2 and 4 of the short-term strategies I think could likely to serve our long-term interests. Security guarantees with a sustained U.S. military presence would be incentive for Japan and South Korea to not accelerate an arms race in the region (a race itself, as the U.S. and Soviet Union proved in the 1980's does not, itself, constitute nuclear engagement; it does, however, increase the fear which makes everyone more edgy and makes conflicts more scary and dangerous). An IAEA bank of enriched uranium and a sustained commitment to the IAEA as an inspections and independent non-proliferation institution are decent short-term strategies for giving incentive to countries considering nuclear programs to not pursue them and demonstrating a continued commitment to independent institutions committed to nuclear non-proliferation.
Suggestions 2 and 4 are both short-term in their thinking and come with important trade-offs to consider. Strengthening the U.N. as a institution committed to democratic engagement about non-proliferation is an important idea and one that keeps communication channels open around a heated and fear-provoking issue like nuclear proliferation. A sanctions regime, however, escalates the cycle of aggression, threats and counter-threats and defiance between democratic countries of the West and Iran and North Korea. The empirical evidence from the last 3 years or so is that the more threats are made, the more ambitiously that both countries pursue nuclear weapons. If we want to accelerate those ambitions, an effective strategy would seem to be to increase the level of aggression and threats and counter-threats between those countries. It's true that a sanctions regime will likely wear off in a year or so. It's also likely, given recent experience, that we will see a North Korean and/or Iranian regime with a wetter appetite, if not more material commitment, to a nuclear program rather than less once sanctions have broken down. It's a gamble. And it's a gamble that we have been losing in the last 3 years or so. It seems foolish to keep betting on a losing horse without considering that perhaps its the horse we're betting on rather than a being loyal to a failing horse or, worse, believing that the race is unwinnable.
Similarly, suggestion 4, threatening dire reprisals in case of North Korean nuclear exports, makes sense if and when they have nuclear materials that are developed and plentiful enough to warrant eminent concern about such exports and only when we are thoroughly convinced that such exports are occuring and that it is immediately clear that nuclear materials are ending up in the hands of dangerous actors. We can warn North Korea not to engage in such exports and that we will take whatever action we deem necessary to prevent Al Queda from getting nuclear materials (which would constitute an eminent threat, obviously, given our history with Al Queda and their standing real threats and destruction to U.S. citizens and interests).
But our immediate history with North Korea and Iran suggests that the more we threaten them around this issue, the more threatened they feel and the more ambitiously they engage in a defensive and aggressive posture that, paradoxically, leads them to be more ambitious in their pursuit of a nuclear program and, conceivably, to seek out allies in their antagonism towards U.S. and other democratic countries' interests.
If we ignore our immediate history with these countries, we will likely face more of the same, which has led to accelerated nuclear ambitions for both countries, rather than decelerated ambitions, which is our goal. An empirical squaring of our goals and the results of our recent efforts would suggest that we deal with North Korea and Iran with less aggression and less threats and more diplomacy more genuinely committed to North Korean and Iranian interests.
Which gets us to Joe's last most long-term suggestion, which is a focus on North Korean economic (and I would add political) integration into the international political and economic order, a move that has made serious gains in reducing antagonisms and increasing cooperation between the U.S. and China and Vietnam, in the region, at the very least.
Joe makes that integration conditional on Pyongpang's willingness to give up its nuclear ambitions, and predicts that within the decade the North Korean regime will disappear (and if I am interpreting him correctly, and I would agree, he is referring to the Communist regime, period, rather than to Kim Jong Il's rule, specifically). That makes sense insofar as political integration needs to involve trust-building measures that North Korea is not looking to threaten its neighbors to the South or the U.S. or looking to export materials in ways that would threaten democratic or allied and even non-allied countries.
But integration should also happen independently of a full-fledged commitment by North Korea to abandon its nuclear capabilities, I think, given the power of political and economic integration to seriously improve the relationships and the likelihood of military confrontation between China and the U.S., for instance, an effort that should be tried and repeated, if possible, with regimes like North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, etc. when possible.
Economic and political integration do not mean that we have to trust regimes we know are not trustworthy. But they build trust where is would not exist otherwise and make military confrontations far less likely. It is not just democratic nations that threaten other democratic nations less, I believe. It is democratic nations openly and respectfully engaged with other democratic and even non-democratic nations that means for more democratic and peaceful, diplomatic engagement over serious issues like non-proliferation which look after the common interests of countries and populations and reducing propensities for military confrontations or provocations. China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are all examples of powerful autocratic countries that offer less threat and more cooperation to U.S. interests and to the interests of other U.N. member countries the more they are constructively engaged around mutual interests and the less their interests are treated as mutually exclusive with U.S. strategic interests. North Korea and Iran are clearly more dangerous actors. But there is reason to believe that successes with constructive engagement with China and Vietnam, for instance, might be repeated in North Korea and Iran, given a sufficient commitment to the long-term interests of North Korean and Iranian nations and peoples. Economic and political integration and engagement make sense independent of conditions, but conditions would be good trust-building measures in strengthening relations between North Korea and Iran and their democratic neighbors, which would serve the mutual interests of all parties involved. All options, more and less aggressive, are always available given a more immediate threat from either regime. But more aggressive options clearly come with consequences, many of which have been counterproductive and fueled their nuclear appetites rather than ended them.
Joe ends with concluding thoughts on the non-proliferation enterprise generally:
"North Korea's nuclear test is not the end of the nonproliferation regime if we develop such a strategy. The resumption of the six-party talks is a first small step. For those who believe that the horse is out of the barn, the answer is that it matters how many horses are out and how fast they are running. This race is far from over."
That is true. And we must recognize the reality from both our failures to threaten Iran or North Korea into submission and in our unintentional provocation of Iran and North Korea to increase and materially support their nuclear ambitions that future non-proliferation, as with past non-proliferation, has depended in large part, despite our wishes otherwise, on the good faith commitment by member countries to make and keep agreements to principles around non-proliferation -- namely that arms races increase dangers and threats to all countries, with weapons with potentially serious and massive consequences and therefore should be avoided -- rather than with coerced regimes, per se.
It is completely clear that the withdrawal of North Korea from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the assertion of the right by Iran to pursue such a program (though only a civilian program has been detected by the IAEA at this point) have occured after both were being confronted with threats from the U.S. as members of President Bush's Axis of Evil and as the U.S. made accusations around their programs. The U.S. provokes with accusations and threats, and the consequence is an Iranian regime and a North Korean regime that, feeling threatened and defensive, assert their right to nuclear materials and to pursue nuclear options more rather than less in the face of such provocation. The U.S. is not to blame for a North Korean or Iranian nuclear program, but we must recognize our role in their development if we want to cease their development. If we want that cycle to end, we will need to recognize how our aggression and actions may, in fact, accelerate the cycle, rather than reduce the propensity for more aggression and provocation and proliferation.
Everyone has good reason to be concerned about North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Neither regime is particularly trustworthy with such dangerous weapons, and their provocative behavior -- especially on the part of North Korea -- reflect leadership that is both dangerous and unpredictable.
But we must be vigilant and rigorous in our critical evaluation of how our policies and actions are effective, ineffective and/or counterproductive in making those regimes and the international community more or less safe or dangerous given the realities we face with non-proliferation. Stubbornly pursuing policies that undermine our goals is a mistake. And not recognizing our failures and the increased threat that we face 3 years after pursuing each regime with threats and aggression makes it very difficult for us to develop more effective policies to contain this threat.
Future failure will undoubtedly be needed for us to face our need to develop a sustainable, long-term commitment to diplomacy, engagement, and sustained relations built on mutual interests, with options to take more aggressive actions when threats of nuclear exports to bad actors like Al Queda or nuclear attack are more imminent rather than as distant as they are today, if we are to get beyond the nuclear stand-off that we have faced for the last 3 years. That stand-off, involving threats and provocations by the U.S. and U.N. member countries, has led to a more nuclear armed North Korea and an Iran which may very well be developing nuclear weapons but which is certainly more committed to their development in light of our aggressive posture.
If we want North Korea's and Iran's defensive and provocative nuclear ambitions to end, we will need to significantly curb our own aggression and provocation. Building institutions and relationships that build and sustain trust around nuclear and other security issues is a far more promising path to nuclear and international security than accelerating the cycle of aggression.
