Charles Krauthammer and the delusions of power

Charles Krauthammer writes a thoughtful column on deterrence, today, against an Iranian strike on Israel that is worth a read, I think.

The Holocaust Declaration

Deterring the Undeterrable

Charles' comfort with American hegemony is hardly comforting to me, much of the time. It's an impossible policy to maintain, of course, nor is it liberal (in a classical sense), democratic or desireable. But even an embrace of America swaggering its power about is reason to be concerned about anyone's thinking about power. Lord Acton had wiser things to say about the matter, I think.

Having said that, it is true, I think, that America should make clear that America will stand with Israel and respond to any attack on her soil.

That's not as ambitious a policy as I would adopt, nor is it enough to ward off any attack, as Charles concedes may be true. I actually do not believe that Iran would attack Israel without some serious provocation, which, I would acknowledge is more likely with Iran having the bomb. The leadership in both Israel and Iran operate under policies of fear and insecurity and are too ready to use military force when fear-driven rhetoric is used rather than diplomacy. That is the problem, fundamentally, which is why, though, obviously any American security policy must be backed by a clear and credible deterrent of military force, it is not nearly enough to resolve the issues between Israel and any of her neighbors, including Iran.

On-going regional security/peace discussions, like the ones already convened by the Bush Administration to deal with the situation in Iraq, that has been bandied about would be a good idea to explore. But so would direct bilateral talks with Iran, as Barack Obama has suggested.

As long as our relationship with Iran is one based on premises that seek to manipulate their sense of insecurity - by withholding engagement, by trying to isolate their regime, and by otherwise trying to establish dominant status that only serves to further reinforce their sense of real and imagined insecurity that drives their nuclear ambitions, right now - which, by my lights and, I think, by the objective evidence given Iran's recent announcement of their intentions to build 6000 new centrifuges, have become more ambitious and not less since our efforts from 2003 - rather than genuinely engage their security and other interests, the Iranian regime, with or without Ahmadinejad, will likely resent and resist American efforts to get them to give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The deeper issue is not just deterrence, though that may be necessary since there are all kinds of reasons to suggest for us that diplomacy may fail to dissaude the Iranians from using a nuclear weapon.There are also all kinds of reasons to think that diplomacy would fail to prevent Pakistan from bombing India, at any particular point that those relations might heat up.

But that hasn't happened yet. And there's not much reason to think that it would happen in the near future.

The deeper issue is addressing Iran's sense, as a nation, Ahmadinejad's sense, as a political leader, and the sense of most Mideast states and political leadership of insecurity in an often violent and chaotic Middle Eastern world, especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is why on-going regional conferences that address such issues make sense. But it is also why bilateral diplomacy makes sense, as well, and