I'm in the middle of U.S. Air Force (I know, Phoenix:):) LTC (Lieutenant Colonel?) Tony Pfaff's fascinating discussion of the overlap of police and military rationales for use of force in complex military/peace-keeping/criminal law enforcement situations...
Ethics in Complex Contingencies: New Demands on the Warrior Ethic...LTC Tony Pfaff...
I was kind of curious whether others were writing/discussing principles like least possible necessary force or least possible necessary aggression...
And LTC Pfaff's article was the first I happened upon...
It's a fascinating discussion of military and police ethics that I highly recommend to anyone interested in the use of force and the practical implications of the ethics of its use...
I'm still not done with it...so I'll try to comment more later...
But two things in the meantime...
First...this is a really welcome look at the emerging need for joint efforts by law enforcement and military personell in combat and law-enforcement efforts (Tony gives an example of joint police and Marine efforts during the 1992 Los Angeles riots that is a really fascinating illustration of how law enforcement and military personell differ when they use the term "cover")...
...and of the general philosophical issues around the use of force...
I understand and yet disagree with Tony's dichotimization of least possible force and most possible force between law enforcement and military...I don't think Tony's thinking broadly enough about what would constitute "most possible force" (he clarifies this in a graph below that illustrates, better, I think, that Tony is talking about more and less force...not most possible force as I think he mislabels it...most possible force could involve an awful lot of force, if one really thinks about it...including the use of atomic or nuclear weapons to resolve all matters of military conflict...something that I don't think that Tony is advocating)...
Tony is not arguing literally for the most possible force, as he argues later...he is arguing for most possible force by military personell with the restraints of proportionality and discrimination...which he goes into with some detail in this paper...
The graph, I think, helps to illustrate what Tony is arguing...that law enforcement uses less force -- though, while I wish they would use the least possible necessary force...they often, do not...and often with full consent of civilians...not as a matter of violating any law enforcement ethic -- and that the military tends to use more force...for reasons that are understandable...something I totally agree with, of course...
Tony uses deontological principles as the principle to limit force in military situations...which I think is a mistake...deontological principles, as Tony rightly argues, are absolutes...
"You don't do such and such because it's wrong...period" (I ran a deontological case my freshman year of college in debate and it was a bitch to defend because of all of the problems inherent in the flawed logic of deontology...Immanuel Kant, notwithstanding:):):)...
But...as Tony argues later in his paper...this is a really problematic way of arguing that often leads to "morally self-defeating logic," as Tony appropriately calls it when he argues against an absolute principle of no risk to non-combatants during military operations when civilians can be used as human shields (a really fascinating example of the "morally self-defeating" logic, as Tony puts it, of arguing from moral absolutes...which I think applies more generally than Tony is arguing here, beyond just this one example of combatants putting non-combatants at risk during military conflicts)...
I agree, obviously, that military conflict involves more force...though not the most possible force, as Tony argues and, I think, wrongly labels his own argument (which he is not arguing in practice throughout the paper...which is why I think it's a mislabel rather than just a disagreement between Tony and I)...
But I still think that in both military and law-enforcement practice that the least possible NECESSARY force is the principle that should guide how force is used...
Meaning...and I don't think Tony would take issue with this...
If military operations can be undertaken WITHOUT risking civilian lives, they should (as I imagine many if not most military personell in democratic countries, at least, do as much as possible and as much as they think to as is)...
And while I agree with Tony that the use of force can minimize the risk to law enforcement and military folks...
I think Tony is seriously underestimating (and maybe I just haven't gotten to a fuller discussion of this in the paper, yet) how the use of force can INCREASE the risk to military and law-enforcement, which, to my mind, has clearly occurred in Iraq...and to a lesser degree, in Afghanistan...
As Tony argues in the paper...collateral damage means that someone's father, mother, brother, sister, wife, husband, child, girlfriend, boyfriend, friend...whomever...has died...and an awful lot of people want to take revenge in that situation...as well as withholding support for soldiers, in warfare, and police, in law enforcement, who make those mistakes erring on the side of more force and killing or seriously hurting civilians...and, unfortunately, supporting terrorists and insurgents and other actors who are hostile to both those soldiers, democratic countries, generally, and specific democratic countries, like the United States...
I whole-heartedly agree with Tony that military and law-enforcement officials must do more joint training (as I think happens, de facto, a lot, as is...since many of my military friends go on into law enforcement careers like police and prison guard duty)...but Tony and I are thinking of something that more formally explores the overlap and needed collaboration between these groups in dealing with a whole range of issues...
From the Los Angeles riots...to peace-keeping...nation-building...to terrorism...
There are many places where important distinctions need to be made as law enforcement and military responsibilities increasingly overlap...
I think a better way of arguing Tony's case is not that the military use the most possible force (which it clearly doesn't now...and shouldn't in the future)...nor that law enforcement use the least possible force (which is also a complicated principle...I changed the principles I was working with from least possible aggression to least possible necessary aggression to avoid the confusion that somehow I was expected people to adopt "morally self-defeating," (as Tony would put it) principles of pacifism in the face of aggression...which I don't think are appropriate principles at all...but rather that they use the least possible NECESSARY aggression or force, to avoid the unintended consequences that often come with the use of aggression either, one, when it is not necessary...or two, using too much force, when lesser force would accomplish the mission, in a military context, or secure the situation, in a law enforcement context...
Tony's conclusions are important to ponder, I think...both because of his appropriate focus, I think, on a better developed professional education that deals with law-enforcement and military joint exercises...and his focus on the political benefits from taking the moral high ground in warfare...and remembering that the moral high-ground -- not a morally self-defeating moral absolutism...but authentic moral high ground that comes from the better use of moral judgment based on utilitarian principles, properly understood -- not the morally bankrupt principal that the ends justify the means...as is too often practiced in contemporary politics and warfare...but the moral utilitarian principles that long term moral ends should be considered when choosing means... more than based on morally absolute deontological principles...which are inherently, I believe, morally self-defeating, as LTC Pfaff so eloquently puts it:):):)...
"US operations over the last decade are filled with stories of where Coalition forces restrained the use of force in order to preserve civilian lives, even when the law and morality of war did not require it. This author does not question the commitment of the military, as an institution, to upholding the principle of noncombatant immunity. However, what is lacking is a conceptual framework that accounts for how to apply the principle in the wide variety of environments members of the military find themselves—often within the scope of a single operation. This is necessary if we are to have consistency in the face of this complexity.
What also follows from this discussion is that it will not always be clear what threat soldiers are facing, which means it will be up to military professionals to rely on their experience and judgment to discern which approach, criminal or enemy, is appropriate to apply. This underscores the need for a professional education curriculum that accounts for the demands of both models. Further, while the discussion of proportionality and discrimination was meant to suggest the kinds of obligations, permissions and prohibitions that exist regarding the use of military force in complex contingencies, it is by no means complete. The restoration of civic peace is not only a job for the military and more work needs to be done to build a comprehensive approach that draws on the professional resources and experience of civilian institutions which are necessary for creating the conditions for civic peace.
Some may argue that placing such constraints on fighting a deadly enemy needlessly and irresponsibly restrains soldiers from pursuing courses of action that allow them to effectively to protect themselves, as well as the civilians they are sworn to defend. But it is also true that prosecuting a war in a way that violates our own values risks undermining the political will necessary to successfully see the war to a successful end. Coalition forces should pursue an aggressive policy by which they engage insurgents and terrorists wherever and whenever they find them. But they must also must recognize when violations of individuals’ right to life and liberty is not permissible and restrain the use of force accordingly.
This requires policies and procedures that recognize necessity must be constrained and interpreted in different ways, depending on the situation in which it is applied. In some cases it means using the most force permissible, given the restrictions of proportionality and discrimination. In others, it means using the least possible and never in such a way that civilians are knowingly put at risk. Furthermore, even if in particular situations conforming to moral obligations leads to restraint and perhaps missed opportunities, this may be the short-term price to pay in order to gain the long-term benefit maintaining the moral high-ground brings.[41]"
I definitely encourage those who are interested in the use of force in international policy, in warfare, in law enforcement, and even just in everday life to check out Tony's very thoughtful discussion of its use in this article:):):)...
I'll write more as I finish the article:):):)...
Ben
More on Tony's article:):)...
There are many issues that I would want to touch on in Tony's article...
But one, in particular...is Tony's discussion of the distinctions between what he calls fourth generation warfare and previous military conflicts and dealings with terrorism...
Tony, I think, is trying to deal with the complex discussion of how terorists should be treated...terrorism, Tony rightly argues, I think, is a complex matter for military and law enforcement officials...it is crime, in the sense that is is murder for political ends...and it generally uses low-level warfare...but it is distinct from warfare between states or populations in the sense that is is warfare that is generally regarded as illegal, often and generally in the states or among populations where it is conducted...
So the need for some kind of military response is present since conventional law enforcement are not prepared or armed to deal with such matters...and yet...terrorists, as much as possible, need to be brought to justice to account for their crimes, rather than treated as simply enemy combatants...but their armed resistance and their threat to the lives, bodies, and property of civilians and others complicates this effort...
But Tony is wrong to argue, I think, that 9/11 represents some kind of qualitatively different form of terrorist crime that existed pre-9/11...terrorism, in its nature, involves a threat from those engaged in some kind of guerrila warfare to states and civilians, as much as a form of organized crime...
What separates terrorism, as a category of crime and warfare, from, say, the mafia...is that mobsters do not typically engage in guerilla warfare to accomplish their ends...and that mobsters are not typically engaged in organized crime for political reason...they usually use criminal means to violently enforce their desire for money, power, influence, etc...
But neither of these groups of criminals are sanctioned by a government or by law...which clearly doesn't necessarily make combatants legitimate, as the principle of just war, itself implies...since, in order for war to be just, one set of combatants needs to be engaged in unjust or less just warfare...and another set of combatants needs to be engaged in just or more just warfare...noone argues, for instance (I hope) that Saddam's troops were justly governing Iraq and fighting American forces...if they are, they either are naive about the nature of Saddam's totalitarian regime...or callous to the oppression experienced by the Iraqi people...
Terrorists, in their nature, typically target states...and, often, civilians...contrary to Tony's analysis of the situation...
Meaning...the challenge we face today...is not because the threat has changed necessarily...
It is because our view and reasoning about the situation has both filled out in terms of the complex realities, initially...and because we are beginning to think about these matters, differently, given those new realities...we are all becoming, hopefully, better policy thinkers, in other words...
And one of the most important realities of terrorism that has changed...is that we have found more successful ways to deal with terrorism than simply trying to crush terrorist forces...which has been largely unsuccessful in the past...
And...in Northern Ireland...in Israel...at Guantanamo...at Abu Grahib...and in a whole host of situations...
We have learned that rationalizing "by any means necessary" has consequences that we never intended in dealing with terrorism...that necessitates a more sophisticated way of dealing with this very sophisticated form of crime and guerilla warfare...
We've made a lot of mistakes over the course of dealing with these and other various challenges...we...as a country...and as a culture...not just individuals that we might scapegoat for our general failures in reasoning and responses...
And we owe a lot of slack to individual soldiers who are charged with conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other places around the world that we have both engaged with good intentions...and that we've made serious mistakes around, especially larger policy mistakes, over the course of our operations in the last 5 years or so...
As LTC Pfaff makes clear in this article...the problems associated with the complexities in these wars and in dealing with terrorism are not "attitudinal," as Human Rights Watch charges...
They are theoretical...they are at the level at which we think...not just at the level at which we feel...
And LTC Pfaff makes a very admirable effort to think at a broader level on these matters that we should all take seriously if we are to treat both civilians and service people with the kind of respect for their lives and their freedoms and their judgments and consciences that they deserve...