The freedom of conscience and thought...
David McCullough, one of the nation's most respected historians, is interviewed in this week's USA Weekend by descendants of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Patrick Henry...
http://www.usaweekend.com/06_issues/060702/060702founding_fathers.html
It's fascinating the perspective that McCullough has to offer about how human and yet how idealistic the founding fathers were...and his analysis of John Adams' last words to some of his supporters when asked what they should say on his behalf at a ceremony commemorating the 50th Anniversary celebration of the Declaration of Independence, the July 4th that both he and Thomas Jefferson died...
He replied...
"'Independence forever.' They asked him if he'd like to add a little bit more to that. He told them, 'Not a word!' He was thinking about independence of the mind -- the freedom to think for yourself -- not just freedom of religion or speech. To many, this is one of the greatest of freedoms."
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, ideological and political rivals during much of their political careers, reconciled their personal relationship later in life and wrote letters that are some of the more thoughtful reflections on American democracy of that time and, McCullough argues, of all time...
They both died the same day...July 4, 1826...the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of the Independence...
And it's interesting to me that McCullough would affirm what I agree was probably the most fundamental of freedoms that the founding fathers offered us...
The freedom of conscience and thought...
It's a freedom so often taken for granted...and yet so fundamental to who we are, today...one that we have much work and thought to reconcile with our policies and ideas about how to improve humanity and our country...but one that is our most fundamental guide to resolving the questions and issues we face...
Gordon Woods, another most respected historian of the American Revolution, argues in The Radicalism of the American Revolution, one of his finer histories of the Revolutionary War period, that the history of America is not only progressive, in the sense that it improves over time and that it follows ideals that are both held and discovered over time by each generation...but that it is also guided, ultimately, by the only most important power, alone...
The power of ideas...
His Radicalism of the American Revolution both details the radical elements -- both in the contemporary sense of radicalism, meaning extremes on all sides of political questions of the day, but also in the classical sense of radicalism, as in the affirmation of democratic principles and reform, such as universal suffrage -- but how the great shaping force of American history during this period was the slow evolution of thought...
From monarchy to republicanism to democracy...
It's a brilliant book, if you ever get the chance...and one of the most deeply insightful histories of the American Revolutionary period that I have ever read...
The book is divided into the progression of that history along those three ideas...how monarchy, republicanism, and democracy each hold, lose, and then gain sway over the American imagination...and often in ways that framers never imagined and, at times, never intended...
It's brilliant...and a brilliant illustration of how ideas and ideals are the great animating forces of the progression of history...and a powerful and difficult to rebut illustration of both the idea that history is progressive and that people improve, over time, and that it is the highest ideals and the strongest ideas that lead us in more progressive directions...
The American Revolution, Woods argues, was not the kind of social revolution embodied in the French Revolution...it was a much more orderly transition from more hierarchical relationships between governors and the governed, patriarchs and plebians, fathers and sons to a more democratic and egalitarian society invested with faith in middle class virtue...and a progression of ideas, from more monarchical to more democratic thought and relationships...
And it is likely, I think, that the animating nature of thought was the reason why founding fathers like Adams and Jefferson believed that independence of thought, freedom of conscience was one of if not the most important freedom that the American Revolution and the American democratic experiment offered Americans and the world...
We so take it for granted...our freedom to think for ourselves and to exercise independence of thought...the Founding Fathers did as well...Adams is famous for passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, some of the most restrictive legislation on freedom of speech and conscience in American history, repressing criticism of the new American government, especially in war time...
But he and Jefferson, both, had lived through a period of world history where that freedom was not so easy to come by...and they finally decided that they would be willing to risk life and limb to secure that freedom, so that their progeny would be able to take that freedom for granted and work to affirm it at every point at which it was challenged...
This Independence Day offers us the opportunity to reflect on that freedom and the way that it animates our lives and how, like the Founding Fathers, we are human even a we strive for ideals, and how we often take that freedom -- the freedom of conscience and thought -- for granted...and how opportunities for reflection can give us a better appreciation for how important that freedom is...
I hope everyone has a great 4th of July...a time to reflect humbly on the powerful ideals that shape our lives...
Love,
Ben
9 comments:
I wonder sometimes if that progressive chain hasn't been broken (or at least weakened) by a combination of greed and the creation of a political "industry." I'd like to believe otherwise, of course.
There's also this growing willingness to compromise principles in the pursuit of security that feels more regressive than progresive to me. Perhaps one could argue that thought and objectives are rationally shifting in the face of changing times. I'd like to think that the march of ideas need not retreat to a position that devalues liberty interests, but sometimes I wonder...
Nifty post and I have been motivated to learn more about the revolutionary period. It's interesting to me--that era receives scant attention from popular media and entertainment outlets compared to most of our history from the Civil War onward. It's one of those things you really have to choose to learn about.
I am anxiously awaiting a brief explanation of how your "smart, not soft" perspective of geopolitics would shape our policy toward North Korea...
Carson, there's so much in what you said that I started to try to address them all and it just got kind of confusing...the campaign finance question is one that David McCullough, appropriately, addressed in that USA Weekend article (it was the only contemporary question that he addressed openly in that article)...I don't believe in campaign finance regulation, but I, like most people, do believe that there are serious problems with money and politics...George Will has made the best free speech objections, that I agree with -- the most recent Russ Feingold election illustrating the problem very well, I think -- and my major objections are with how to effectively deal with problems with money and politics which I and I would seriously bet George would agree is a serious problem...there's a lot to the question of how do we effectively deal with a problem that has not seemed to get substantially better with 30 years of legislation governing it and as with, say, drug abuse, is more of a question of how to we deal with the problem rather than do we deal with it or not...
Meaning...to my mind...probably the singular most important problem for questions of "progress" is what it looks like...and what I love about Woods' Radicalism of the American Revolution is that he makes so clear how progressive history is, overall, even given periods of regression or problems that remain serious...the significance of progressive history, here, is not that it is politically liberal, in a contemporary sense, but that we generally move forward on important cultural and public policy questions, resolving questions in ways that we generally adopt as a matter of democratic values, even as we have periods where questions are seriously unresolved or where we move backwards by the standards of later generations...conservative ideas can be progressive, in this sense, but progressive, here, is distinct from a specific conservative interpretation of history that implies that we get worse or have gotten worse, over time, as standards of different sorts, moral, especially, have fallen...
I think progressive history moves in a more generally libertarian and democratic direction (more DeToqueville than Ayn Ran), for important reasons around the most effective use of government as much as around how particular policy and cultural questions best get resolution, at individual and aggregate levels...meaning, because I think public trust in government for important functions like security are undermined by too much government involvement in ways that civil society -- like the non-profit, University, and even for-profit sector -- would likely better care for...it's not, to my mind, a matter of do we care for common problems or not...it's who best cares for them...and what problems come with government involvement...
I am WAY, WAY underarguing this and all of these points, right now, Carson -- which is the heart of my book idea -- that there are limits to the good to which power rather than other means can be put to solve important cultural and policy problems, and there is much more substance to this position than is present in this response...I'm just concerned that it's too much in one post comment...
What I'll do, Carson, because I think there's a lot to these positions that just needs more space for argument is I'll write a post on North Korea, as soon as I get a chance -- the Administration is handling the situation much better, now than before and much better than Iran; I would begin by reducing the pressure, acknowledging their right to self-defense, engage them constructively, as the Clinton Administration did very successfully with China and Vietnam, and work to persuade them to lower its gunsights on South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. with the 6-party talks and following the brilliant lead of South Korea in those last talks -- and then maybe address some of these questions in more depth...
This is good, because it gives me a chance to write/talk about them, in depth, and then get more feedback about them...I'm just afraid that this little space doesn't really do them justice to give you a better idea of why someone who has spent most of his early days studying politics/policy advocating campaign finance reform/regulation thinks that it might be better to rethink them, even as I very much agree with their intent, and why I think the more progressive elements of history are more libertarian, with constructive options for dealing with important policy questions -- like education and health care -- rather than just kind of leaving them up to the market to solve, for instance...
And the other question I wanted to spend more time on, Carson, after your post, is why I think history is progressive and what that looks like, given, say, Woods' thesis that Andrew Jackson's Presidency was the fulfillment of the democratic commitments of Founding Fathers who were disgusted and alarmed by his rise to political power...
This shorthand is a poor substitute for more elaborated argument, Carson...I just want to take some time with each of these positions so you aren't left with the impression that I'm arguing more naive or calloused or reactive versions of any of them...my thinking about the world hasn't flipped...it's just got new layers that lead me to think about issues differently, today...
Ben
That's one helluva answer, really, considering how under-formed my reaction was. :-)
I don't have firsthand experience with Woods, but you are tempting me to switch from the nightly crossword puzzle to some extra reading.
I think this NK situation is particularly interesting on so many levels, including the ones you mentioned. Also interesting, but rarely discussed, is the potential lack of underlying stability in NK.
Once Kim Jong Il goes, it might just be a free-for-all. None of his three sons appear to be compelling Stalinist successor material, and in a country with over 1.1 million people in the army (who are also among the only ones who really eat worth a shit), there is a strong chance of military successorship when he keels.
A few years ago when Kim Jong Il was wrongly said to be dead, the loudspeakers on the NK side of the DMZ were announcing that one of the high-ranking military officials was now the nation's leader.
So, how do you engage in long-term negotiations and strategic planning with a potentially disposable leadership and absolutely no clear idea of who is coming next or what they will want?
In my estimation, it's in everyone's best interests to use the current mess as a springboard to some serious, fast-paced work at changing policy toward NK on many levels. I am beginning to believe that the missile tests have to be seen less as a threat and more as a "good excuse" to start a real dialog with NK that can make rash/destructive actions on the part of the succeeding regime far less likely.
Anyway, we can talk about all of this later in more detail. I have to get going...
Oh, by the way, if you are interested in doing some voice work, drop me a line.
Carson
Re: North Korea, Carson...
Everything you said is dead-on and brilliant, Carson...
It's the perpetual irony of dictatorships, isn't it?...they are adopted in the hopes of creating some elusive perfect state of security...and the irony is that they always end up being terribly unstable...I saw this really brilliant article out of Harvard that's on my blog somewhere on terrorism, Carson, that argued that terrorism actually occurred more often in transitions from autocracies to democracies...meaning, right after an authoritarian regime collapses...and what you said gets right to the heart of why that happens...there's this really brilliant article in the most recent The American Interest, Carson, by this liberal-minded Navy Defense College academic who has this really terrific analysis of the very complex dynamics of reactions of traditional societies to challenges to democratize (and my experience, Carson, is that most autocracies, no matter their ideology -- Communist, Fascist, Nazi, etc. -- tend to be traditional/repressive in their general social outlooks (totally open to being wrong about that; just my observation)...and she really explains well the complexities and the sources of cultural instability as much as the political instability that happen when countries are pressured to democratize...
A very good reason, as you allude, to not pressure for democratization, I think, but to persuade North Korean leaders to make as orderly and peaceful a transition as possible (when we get to a point where we can have that conversation with the North Koreans, which we undermine, ironically, every time we play geopolitical cowboy...perhaps a lesson the Administration is beginning to learn)...
I think what your analysis makes clear, Carson, is that it is not democratization that creates that greater propensity towards authoritarianism...that it could be many things, but in all likelihood, fundamentally, it is about the underlying political instability that authoritarianism paradoxically creates...as well, which gets to the point of the American Interest article, with the self-perception by terrorist groups as the enforcers of authority that they perceive authoritarian governments as failing to effectively provide...she's talking about Islamist societies, Carson, but I would bet dollars to donuts that you could apply similar analysis to Communist splinter groups in Communist groups (the Viet Cong, maybe...I'm too tired to read the Wikipedia entry with any coherence, at this point, Carson:):)...
It's possible, of course, that the kind of instability you're talking about it localized to the DPRK, but for some reason, I doubt that...
On NK, proper...that's really brilliant forethought, I think, Carson...I don't know what you do with that situation except as I hear what you're saying, Carson, I'm thinking, you probably don't want to back those kinds of folks into a corner...as you're alluding to, it might just radicalize the leadership and support claims for the need for more militaristic leadership to fend off the great Yankee imperialists whose hands are paradoxically strengthened as you have Americans like Ashton Carter and William Perry talking up the possibility of striking them (how in the world they thought they were going to convince North Koreans to distinguish between an attack on a missile that they largely view as defensive, I would bet, and an attack on North Korea, the North Korean government, or the North Korean people -- all more likely interpretations on their part, I think -- is completely beyond me...
Yeah...that's brilliant forethought, Carson...
You what is so good about talking with you about this stuff, Carson?...you keep me honest...the truth is that I nor noone else knows definitely how to resolve this nuclear crisis, to avoid a more stridently nationalist and hostile successor government, or to persuade North Korea to consider more open and democratic approaches as Clinton successfully did in Vietnam and China...we just know some better ideas and better thinking, perhaps, that might -- maybe? hopefully? -- get us closer...
Yeah...it's crazy isn't it, Carson...the Administration's getting better at looking more than 2 feet in front of their faces -- though, in their defense, as I thought more realistically about having that responsibility on my shoulder, I begin to realize just what a heavy and highest-pressure burden it really is...it's to their credit that they've toned things down in the face all of that pressure -- but you and I, I really do think because we just don't have all that pressure weighing immediately on our shoulders, can be so much more thoughtful that I at least intuit that the Administration is being about this situation and its place in the context of the larger issues on the Korean peninsula...
Japan and the U.S., I think, right now, are being rash with talk of sanctions...
They should listen to South Korea, who saved their asses the first time around on this one...they should engage in patient, low-pressure dialogue...and work to build stronger relationships, generally, with the entire North Korean leadership, as you suggest...that is what turned the tide for Reagan in his dealings with Gorbachev...he convinced him to look more honestly at the less flattering legacies of Communism, and Gorbachev took the rest from there without Reagan even having to be in office to initiate perestroika and glasnost to change the Soviet Union and the world, forever...
Can hawks really believe that the Soviets made those changes because we kept threatening to nuke them? Give me a fuckin' break...Gorbachev initiated those changes because he was finally convinced that Communism was responsible for so many of the problems his country faced and perestroika and glasnost were nascent, slow democraticizing steps that he took without any American pressure, whatsover...
Yeah, we just gotta learn the right lessons from history, Carson:):)...
I'll write soon as a more formal post...you're feedback and engagement, though, is super, super helpful...it's so nice to talk with someone who has an eye for realpolitik and not just wishes about how the world should be:):)...
Do you realize what a huge advantage you have over most people who think about politics, Carson? It makes talking about it about 100 times easier and more productive because I don't have to sit and explain to people over and over the very basic political principle of reconciling political ideals with the art of the possible:):)...
Talk with you soon, I hope, bud:):)...
Ben
...when we get to a point where we can have that conversation with the North Koreans...
...about democracy/democratization, that is...
The more I think about it the more less likely I believe the administration is "growing up." I tend to believe, instead, that they are able to discern real issues from phony ones better than John Q. Public.
Iraq was silly, but low risk. There were numerous advantages to those with whom Bush & Co. are aligned to going in there and whacking Saddam, etc., and no real "holy shit we're gonna end the world" risk associated with it.
The war on Iraq accomoplished (or had the potential to accomplish) some real political goals for the administration, and the post 9-11 mindest of the public made it possible to pursue those objectives in a way that was undoubtedly perceived as comfortable by the higher-ups.
I mean, really, what was the worst case scenario to going into Iraq like we did? We are basically looking at it now, and none of us are building bomb shelters or stocking up on canned goods. I imagine the leadership here said, "look, even if it all falls to shit, nothing THAT bad is really gonna happen, and we should be able to avoid negative domestic sentiments because of the terror thing and because we can trot Colin Powell out in front of the Security Council and sell the hell out of this deal..."
I am not so cynical as to think we (and I hate to use that pronoun in situations like this) didn't believe there were some principled justifications for the action. However, I think the great struck of luck for Bush & Co. was that the principles happened to line up with public sentiments and a relatively low risk of disaster at just the right time.
As it turns out, we got something approximating the worst case scenario and at-home political opposition is a bit stronger than one might have anticipated. Still, not a planet-killer scenario, though.
NK is different. The players are bigger, meaner and more economically critical (esp. China, Russia and Japan). Those 1.1 million NK troops and our history in the area both tell us that "shock and awe" are more likely to galvanize those on the other side than frighten them. The presence of REAL WMDs doesn't help matters, either.
This time, the neo-con principles just don't match up with the risk level enough to bulldoze ahead. Nor, really, does the political climate at home. No one wants to be in NK, Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, esp. with November approaching and people already burning flags in Chicago streets. The political capital was spent in Iraq and the principles supporting action in one part of the triad of "evil" just aren't enough to get Bush to pull the trigger this time.
One can argue they've learned a lesson, but I doubt it. I think they knew the lesson long ago. They were prepared to pick and choose when to rally for war based on strong principles only when low casualties and public support were on their side.
So, when the easy way out doesn't fit the plan, you gotta start acting smarter. These guys were capable of acting smarter in Iraq--they just didn't HAVE to then...
In any case, you are spot-on about the risks during transitions. If you'll think back to the end of the Soviet Union and the scramble then and for some years after, the top concern of many of the brightest analysts was a spark that might motivate Russia and other former republics to embrace the hardest of the hardliners. We dodged that bullet, luckily (and I personally believe that NATO was more valuable throughout that process than it was during the Cold War, but that's another story for another day).
Look at the less armed and dangerous countries and what happens when the strongman collapses. Haiti ring a bell? You are right... It's a great irony... The nations who are inflexibly stable due to authoritarian leanings are the ones that are the most frightening during transitions.
This has never been more true than with NK. Nucs or no nucs, there are 1.1 million armed troops in a completely isolated nation that haven't heard a word from anyone other than Fearless Leader for as long as anyone can remember. They are pissed off, hungry, and ready to fight--all they need is the excuse to do it.
I hope we can find a way to use the missile tests to horn in there somehow and open the doors for something more positive. If we can "crack the mask of the hegemone," while simultaneously being "good guys" (or at least something less than "bad guys") in the eyes of likely successor power players, it will be an awesome victory.
Which really brings us to The Big Question. We've seen Bush & Co. exercise a bit of discretion this time because the stakes are higher, etc., but will they really be willing to somehow sell out their b.s. "white hat riding against the axis of evil with six-guns drawn" story they have been telling for years in order to make things work this time around.
If Bush wants to be tough and gutsy and portray himself and America as a courageous nation... Well, the gutsiest thing he could do right now is to admit that alot of the thinking guiding earlier actions wasn't necessarily as invioble as once stated and that he's willing to risk being labeled a hypocrite to make the world a safer place by flip flopping a little bit on the Korean peninsula.
Personally, I doubt he has the guts to do it. Hopefully, though, he can limp through this long enough for us to get someone queued up who can...
That's my opinion, and I may or may not be sticking to it!
CDB
P.S.
One of Kim Jong Il's kids was apparently in Germany recently, attending an Eric Clapton concert.
Although Clapton has fallen mightily since his heyday (I know you recently mentioned liking "Tears in Heaven," but I think everything post-"Slowhand" and maybe even post-"Layla" has been part of a downhill slide) and no one is painting "Clapton is God" on brick walls any more, I think that might be a good sign...
Really, how bad can the kid be if he's able to convince daddy to give him the keys to the plane so he can take his gal to see Clapton, right?
Later,
CDB
RE: Kim Jong Il's son and Clapton...totally:)...I'm all about the sons of paranoid military dictators catching a Clapton concert:):)...I wish I could catch a Clapton concert:):)LOL:):)...
It's so funny, Carson:):)...I was just telling Melissa that I thought Clapton was one of those rarer artists (there are plenty of them, I think...Annie Lennox is another, I think...but they are more rare than common) whose work got better over the years...I should probably listen to more of his early stuff to make that call:):)...but he just stands in such stark contrast to people like Bono and U2 who still make fine music, but nothing they've produced has been as good since 1989 and Rattle and Hum, I don't think:):)...
There's a lot of truth to the idea that political calculations drove decisions in Iraq as much as principled ones, I think, Carson...and their political capital to fight a new war is definitely used up, I think...
And it's totally true that not just China, Russia, and Japan, but France, Great Britain, Germany, and most people in the U.S. would seriously oppose an invasion...though Japan is still too hawkish on this one, I think, and little ol' South Korea is the big unsung hero on this one whose course needs to be followed and advice given heed if we are to initiate the kind of dialogue that I think you are right to be thinking ahead on, Carson...getting lost in the nukes of the moment completely overlooks that power-wrangling disrupts the more serious dialogue about democracy and more normalized relations, over the long haul...has cutting off relations with Iran made them more democratic or respectful of liberal democratic norms?...hardly...to the contrary, it sends all the wrong signals about what democracy is all about, at its best...
Though I do think that amidst all that calculating and cyncism these guys generally try to do what they think is best, even if they are less than idealistic in the course of doing so...most if not all people are kind of cynical in their motivation and abuse their power and authority, truth be told...and politicians are just some of those folks...I wish they were less cynical...but politics (and people) is just so awash with the stuff that's hard to swim in it and not have it clinging to you like Ben Affleck on a paycheck...not that the Administration is not responsible for what greedy, power-hungry bastards they are...and all the places where people don't speak up and express their disagreements with them, they are generally responsible for...particularly in the Administration, which is more open to heterodoxy and disagreement, these days, but still not enough to be taken more seriously...the Clinton Administration had very few conservatives on their team, but they had them and they had good folks like David Gergen...does Bush have ANY liberals or non-conservatives among his inner circle? (Norman Mineta at the Department of Transportation hardly counts:)...
I guess you could also argue that KJI does his best and that the lack of democracy just seriously distorts his worldview, though he certainly seems to pay attention to his public image in international circles and the international discussion has plenty to say about his piss-poor leadership...America has one of the most robust democracies in the world, and we still have a head of state who is very edgy about criticism and very slow to respond to it...imagine that in a non-democratic culture, nevertheless government...though, ironically, I do think that the problem in both cultures is the harshness of the rebuke...a traditional society like North Korea likely uses some serious shame and socially repressive means of dealing with both people who fuck up and the parallel denial that persists in such cultures when people fuck up bad (child marriage law in Iran and protection for rapists in Pakistan are similar forms of denial, I think)...the comparative strength of democratic cultures, I think, is that criticism is more often used in lieu of harsher responses that maintain defenses and make it more difficult to impossible for people to take responsibility for their behavior...and, in the case of a strong-man like Mr. Kim, to give people room to make the criticisms...
I think you are totally right about what Bush's smartest move would be, right now, which is to reflect and think, more, about what he's screwed up, what he needs to do, more, in the future, and acknowledging more openly and honestly his mistakes over the course of the Iraq war, dealings with Iran, and dealings with North Korea...especially ignoring the concerns of the international community and, I think -- though it's gotten little press attention that I've seen -- not consulting Iraqis, and particularly standing Iraqi opposition groups and militias who could have led this effort with overwhelming U.S. force support and seriously undercut impulses to insurgency among average Iraqis nevertheless power-hungry radicals like Sadr...
I just don't think the Administration sees (I just read a Henry Kissinger article in the National Interest rationalizing Bush's worst move with Iran, I think, which is not taking the military option off the table), clearly, those fuck-ups, yet, because they're too damned busy trying to rationalize why they should be able to use any and all options on matters of international policy...it's at that level that I agree with your view, Carson, that this is political calculation...but I just wish the Administration would get off of it and say, "Yeah, we have any and all options we want on whatever matter...but that doesn't mean we should use them all the time, for goodness fuckin' sakes"...
Different options are needed for different situations...totally to my surprise, it turned out that a lot of Iraqis wanted Saddam Hussein out of power and some kind of more democratic future (though I think we all can acknowledge that they definitely should have wanted Saddam out of power, I had no clue that they would support U.S. efforts the way they ended up supporting them) and North Korea is a situation where respecting their self-determination and persuading them in more democratic directions, as with the Soviets, just makes much more sense...
It's so amusing to me, Carson, to watch the Administration and influential policy people, like Henry Kissinger and William Perry, rationalize the use of force at every turn of the corner as if if they didn't do so, the free world and America, at least, will face certain destruction or casualties if they don't...
But, Carson, the Soviet Union in its hey day, represented a far, far greater threat to the U.S. than Iran, which is democratic, now, remember, and North Korea, which is this tiny little Communist country in the Pacific, do today...
People with power just lose perspective on these things, I think, because they get so obsessed with what they can do with all that power now that they have it...
And the Administration is learning the hard lesson, I think, right now, that the more you do this, the more it undermines your credibility...and the more it exposes the weakness of that strategy...
That's why I agree, Carson, that the current period is a regressive one...but largely because we are rationalizing the use of force to tackle any and all problems so openly that it just makes us all look kind of foolish, I think...as if looking more like North Korea or Iraq is the best way to model for them or persuade them that they should look more like us...
But, more importantly, as if these two countries represent even a 10th of the threat that the old Soviet Union did...
And the lesson from our dealings with the Soviet Union should be that persuading a leader to make internal changes to his society because he sees, better, the problems in his society is 100 times more effective than trying to threaten a government or society to change, externally...
I'm not convinced that Hussein was someone that could have been convinced with diplomacy to make those kinds of changes, internally...I just think that we should have had a more open and engaged debate and discussion about the option of war, we should have listened, better, to the concerns from the international community and worked multilaterally on whatever options we chose, we should have consulted, better, with Iraqis and Iraqi opposition groups (surely we could have done that in secret while preparing for a war), and we should have had and still should have a more constructively engaged discussion over the course of the war, where liberals and conservatives are working on options to make the situation better rather than getting lost in recriminations that just make the situation harder...
But I am convinced, as you are, Carson, that North Korea would be a very bad choice for invasion and likely not only much more unstable, but much more likely to fight back more seriously...especially when the U.S. (most citizens included on this one) and the Administration can't seem to get their heads wrapped around the notion that Iran and North Korea, both, with all of their very seriously flawed leadership, have an interest in self-defense especially when the biggest, baddest country in the world is swaggering around and threatening everyone with invasion if people don't do as they please...
I don't trust Ahmadinejad or Kim Jong Il any more than anyone else does...but I do have sense enough to think about this from the perspective of either leader or average Iranians or North Koreans to think, "If Iraq was to invade us, tomorrow, as they've done too recently, would the U.S. step in and have our backs? Doubtful" or "If the U.S. were to fire on our defensive capabilities and North Korean soil, would Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, Great Britain or anyone else step in and show those sons-a-bitches what's what? No fuckin' way"
The big question for me is "What do Iraqis want for their country?" or "What do North Koreans want for their country?"
Iraqis wanted to remove that asshole, I'm convinced, but many of them didn't trust the U.S. and certainly not another Bush to do it, and especially when he didn't even have the sense to talk with some of them, first, or at least representatives that they might have trusted more (Peter Tatchell, I think I told you, Carson, had this really outstanding plan around which opposition groups and militias could have been consulted leading up the to the war that I think would have seriously undercut an insurgency)...I wasn't convinced of that when we went into that war, which is one of the biggest reasons I opposed it, thinking, wrongly, that it would be another Vietnam, even as I very much shared the concern to remove Saddam Hussein...
North Koreans, on the other hand, would fight us tooth and nail, I agree...
"They are pissed off, hungry, and ready to fight--all they need is the excuse to do it."
Exactly...and they, at least, have an ideology to rally around rather than the bizarre, meglamania, cult of personality that was Baathism...
And, in the meantime, why not engage them, diplomatically, as we did the Soviets?...Kim Jong Il is no Mikhail Gorbachev...but he's more likely to be more like Gorbachev (or at least the Chinese or the Vietnamese) the more we engage him and persuade him of the benefits of markets and democracy, as Reagan did Gorbachev and Clinton did the Vietnamese and the Chinese (and how the hell do we persuade the Chinese of the benefits of democracy when we ignore democratic norms with our handling of Iraq, for goodness fuckin' sakes?)
Amhadinejad, we have to remember, already leads a democracy -- an repressive, reactionary, immature democracy, to be sure...but a nascent democracy, nonetheless -- and his leadership should totally humble us as the limits of slinging power around on international questions...perhaps it has or is beginning to...perhaps that is why the Administration is soft-pedalling North Korea more than how it's handled Iran...
Although, mark my words on this one, Carson...Roh Moo-Hyun, South Korea's President, is the real stateman on this whole thing...
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060709/wl_asia_afp/nkoreamissileskoreajapan_060709094910;_ylt=Al8uaja4GQpn5lcKv60XG0OCscEA;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl
Sometimes it just takes a cooler head to resolve an issue, and he is the man of the hour, right now, as far as I'm concerned...
Sometimes, not having much power is a really, really good thing, I'm learning...trim-tabbing, the poverty lobbying group I work with, RESULTS, calls it...the little rudder on a big ship that turns the bigger rudder than turns the bigger rudder that turns the ship...
But you know what I think is the bigger force for democracy in this whole thing, Carson?
The Internet...fuckin' beautiful wonder of technology this thing the internet is, I think...and the most powerful democratizing force in the world, right now, IMHO...
Who knows how many North Koreans or Iranians can afford or get access to the internet?...but you know they're higher ups have or are getting access...and it will be pretty hard for despots and autocrats to constantly point to the bumbling of our power-hungry big men and play victim when they start to find out how much of the world really believes what idiots and assholes they think they really are...
Open, free, democratic cultures just make it really damned hard for people to fail to face reality...and this new-fangled technology -- more than and complimentary with movies, TV, music, books, and other sources of soft power that Joe Nye argues, I think correctly, are much more fundamental to a country's ability to have influence than harder forms of power like military, economic, and political leverage --is changing the fuckin' world, right now...it is certainly changing my fuckin' world...and I assume yours' as well...
More democratic cultures like Iran, I imagine are much more touched by the power of the internet than are more closed cultures like North Korea...but it's only a matter of time, I imagine, before people begin to demand access to the outside world...
And it's a world that they will want more access to the more they perceive it as friendly rather than threatening...and that is the serious mistake that the Administration has been making for the last 6 years, and which I think you show much more foresight around...why are you not a policy scholar, Carson?...sorry I couldn't help myself:):)...
That's what makes Woods' history so brilliant, Carson...because he illustrates with such breadth and depth how the most important changes in a society as a sign of its progress are cultural...
How the more democratic changes in America around the structure of the family and the structure of the economy and the changing liberal democratic values are the far more fundamental changes in the American experience (DeToqueville does the same in Democracy in America around the structure of voluntary organizations and the media with observations that have incredible staying power still almost 200 years later)...
Also Gordon Woods is one of the best writers I've ever encountered in my life...as someone who appreciates good argument structured well, Carson, I think you will really appreciate how a writer can both make strong, well-structured argument and write it with well-crafted prose (it's a progressive history organized around the progression of ideas...first section, Monarcy; second section, Republicanism; third section, Democracy...and it is hard to rebut that progression once you read the narrative that cites primary sources all over the fuckin' place and only when they are necessary...no bullshit referencing...it's incredible stuff)...
OK...I should go take a shower, give you a break, and download some early Clapton...
I'll talk with you soon, bud:):)...
Ben
If Clapton was God, as the graffiti once said, God is dead and his demise occured the day EC decided to perform and release an acoustic version of Layla!
Well, you sold me on Gordon and I might just pick up a copy this weekend.
You (tongue in cheek, I hope) asked why I am not a policy scholar. Well, that might have something to do with my lack of deep grounding in the actual scholarship and reliance upon my own gut reactions, hunches and ruminations that go unchecked by the opinions of actual experts! Ha! I am better suited for the "shoot off your mouth" world of punditry than for actual scholarship, I fear!
In that vein... I respect your breadth of knowledge on all of this and your ability to make connections based upon it. However, I think that you might be more willing than I am to give certain elements credit for intellectual honesty than I am prone to do--particularly with respect to the motivations for going into Iraq.
Maybe that makes me a cynic and carrier of all the evils associated with that tendency. It might also make me too dismissive of other points of view at times. However, in assessing the difference in administration approaches to Iraq and NK, I am experiencing a real "naked emperor" moment.
We dropped the hammer in Iraq, I believe, because (a) we could (while exposing ourselves only to manageable risks), (b) it had potential economic benefits that were unrelated to real security concerns or the lofty principled justifications provided to sell the decision, (c) it created a perceived opportunity to shore up conservative support among the U.S. population.
Did Bush and Co. have some real deeper belief in what they were doing? Maybe so. Maybe so. However, I believe those beliefs were more of a happy accident than an underlying basis for decision.
I say that as a somewhat cynical observer, but that position is supported by a lot of evidence that the underlying principles at work in pushing the decision had absolutely nothing to do with those espoused when making it.
Iraq was on the table before 9/11 and before the war on terror. It was an invasion waiting to happen. The only thing lacking was an excuse and the appropriate political climate among the people of the U.S.
9/11 provided both, and with a great sales campaigh, it happened.
Don't get me wrong--I am not making an argument against the war in Iraq outright, nor am I maintaining that keeping Saddam around was a great alternative. My argument here is less about the war and its prosecution than it is about how and why we got there in the first place.
I tend to think that the best arguments for the war were and are embraced by supporters only as a matter of convenience in an ex post facto kind of way to justify a decision that had a lot more to do with other rationales.
There's no need to simplify it to "blood for oil," but there is a massive economic component to this. A state of war also has a tendency to shift federal politics into a mode more conducive to implementing a conservative agenda. The love of aggression so often displayed by Mr. and Mrs. Average also creates a great deal of political capital potential for wartime leadership. A leader who has a strong distaste for dissent and argument gets to avoid a great deal of that when troops are on the ground. I don't know if the "daddy legacy" is anything more than silliness from the left, but it could have been part of the calculus.
There were legitimate geopolitical interests at stake, too. And, although I think the war did a poor job of realizing them, I can see how some might have genuinely believed them.
The shift in attitude between Iraq and NK, however, is so great that I just cannot believe for a second that the war in Iraq was anything but a war of convenience.
Can you imagine Bush talking about multilateral diplomacy with Iraq back before the invasion? It would never happen. Can you imagine what would have happened to Iraq had they launched ICBMs?
In NK we have a nation with which we have previously warred who has clearly stated their distaste and avowed hatred of us. They have developed WMDs and are rapidly pushing for a workable delivery system. They pose a tremendous threat to regional stability in a critical part of the world. They are led by a tyrant of questionable moral rectitude. They have been completely unresponsive to sanctioning by international bodies. They are a rogue nation acting in violation of their own treaty agreements.
That list of facts was the justification for kicking Hussein's ass. But, when it comes to Kim Jong Il, Bush is ready to get all diplomatic on his ass instead of being shocking and awesome.
Suddenly, those ironclad principles bend to reality. Is that because the administration learned its lessons in the sand? Or, is it because the espoused justification for invading Iraq was a heap of simmering b.s. served up to rationalize an action that had other perceived benefits to the U.S., and particularly Bush-favorable issues.
I suppose there is an alternative... It could be that those guys all believed the neo-con line on Iraq and just lacked the foresight to see how that template would fail when applied to other situations, even though they spoke of it in terms of universal truths and deeply-held values.
As much as I dislike some of administration players, however, I cannot for a second believe that they were that stupid. They knew better all along.
The wonderful part of the NK situation may lie in the way it strips the Iraq model bare and shows us its every wart and weakness. You never hope to have crazy standoffs with bad-hair dictators who like missile testing, but in this case it could have an upside! Ha!
How can people continue to embrace the "go get 'em, tiger" approach we used in Iraq and try to rationalize it based on rock-solid principles when they see how useless that perspective is to deal with other problems and situations, right?
Fukiyama (sp?) bailed on Iraq before the NK thing gathered steam. My guess is that more of the neocons will bail out because of the NK thing.
We've seen what that perspective gets you in Iraq and now we've seen that even true believers will think twice about embracing it as universally as they once said they would.
This whole turn of events should be great for your work, really. I think there was a growing realization that temperance in foreign policy was necessary back in the days of the Cold War. When we established ourselves as the only tough kid on the block after the dissolution of the USSR, I think many became overly emboldened.
Perhaps we have again reached a stage in geopolitics where the risks and untenability of being overly aggressive has become clear to even the most cowboy-prone among us?
That might be the real lesson of dealing with NK on the heels of Iraq and it could be a transformative one in terms of foreign policy thought.
The "handling" Gorbachev's USSR you mentioned was once considered a proud moment in the conduct of foreign policy, at least by many. In the ensuing years, however, those who would embrace the neo-con big gun model have done their damnedest to repaint those historical scenes as part of Sunday matinee western in which an unflinching Reagan brought peace to the cowtown with a glare and a six-shooter. That re-write is bunk, but it's the preferred retelling of history by those in that camp.
Maybe that wacky dude with the horrible hair and a Clapton-loving son will break the fourth wall of conservative Masterpiece Theater and snap us out of our willing suspension of disbelief, pushing us toward a more considerate and balanced approach toward conducting our foreign policy.
Then again, we might try to pull out enough troops to keep the R behind the majority leader's name, elect a Bushalike in 2008, surgically strike NK missile bases in absolute disregard of the international community and then gear up for Shock and Awe Tuesday in Iran. Lather. Rinse. Repeat.
I hope not. I'd like to think the complete inability of our current foreign policy perspective to deal with NK will FORCE us to approach problems in a more responsible manner.
Get the word out, Ben! We're all rooting for you, whether you know it or not!
Carson
Long-winded
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